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on "objective standards" per se and a correspondingly greater premium on
careful selection of able and impartial test administrators will provide a
more effective application of a common measure to all candidates. When
judicial review of a personality rating is sought, a greater presumption of
validity should be accorded the Commission's findings; and the compe-
tency of the examiner, not the "objectivity" of his appraisals, should govern
the outcome. The court's role should be limited to adjudicating charges
of caprice or fraud, not re-appraising personality.
PROPOSALS FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
IN the federal courts, appeals from interlocutory orders have been pro-
hibited, with certain statutory exceptions,' since the initial formulation of the
"final judgment rule' 2 in the Judiciary Act of 1789.3 Justification of this rule
is generally couched in terms of expeditious litigation.4 Presumably, the great
majority of interlocutory decisions are correct, and many erroneous rulings
prove harmless when viewed in light of the final disposition of the case.r A
system permitting the interruption of trial progress to allow a fragmentary
1. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders
(1) granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dis-
solve or modify injunctions; (2) appointing receivers, or refusing to wind up receiver-
ships; (3) determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in
which appeals from final decrees are allowed; (4) in civil actions for patent infringe-
ment which are complete except for accounting. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1948).
2. Twenty consecutive definitions of a final judgment are listed in 4 C.J.S. 187.
For a thorough analysis of the rule, see Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Ap-
peal, 41 YALE L. J. 539 (1932).
3. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73 (1789), provided for appeals from
"final judgments or decrees" only. This limitation applied to appeals from the highest
state courts to the Supreme Court (§ 25) ; from district courts to circuit courts (§ 22) ;
and, by implication, from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court (§ 13). When the
circuit courts of appeals we're established in 1891, their appellate jurisdiction was simi-
larly dependent on the finality of the district (or circuit) court's decision. 26 STAT. 828
(1891). The latest revision of the Judicial Code provides: "The courts of appeals shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ... ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1948).
4. "To be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum
would be arrested' by permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified
cause." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
5. "... [M]any mistakes, apparently important at the time, will be seen to be
trivial from the perspective of a final disposition of the case, and ... disputes will
therefore be more expeditiously settled." Judge Frank, in Perkins v. Endicott Johnson
Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 212 (2d cir. 1942), aff'd 317 U.S. 501 (1943). See Libby-Owens-
Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indust. Corp., 154 F.2d 814, 815 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 859 (1946).
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review of each order would occasion vexatious delays, heavy costs,7 and
overburdened appellate calendars. s
In many instances, however, the final judgment rule may be a wasteful
formality; and under certain circumstances it can gravely jeopardize the
rights of litigants.9 If, for example, in a receivership proceeding or an action
for partition, erroneous decrees are made directing the sale or transfer of
property, an appeal months or years later from a final decision may be of little
avail.' It will be impossible to retrieve the land in question. Moreover, weelcs
6. "Reasons other than conservation of judicial energy sustain the limitation [of the
final judgment requirement]. One is elimination of delays caused by interlocutory ap-
peals." Mr. Justice Rutledge, in Catlin %. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945).
7. The relation of delay to expense is well illustrated in the case of American Ma-
chine and Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co., 173 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1949). In this
action the plaintiff was seeking a judgment declaratory of his right to terminate a
patent contract. The defendant, through a series of procedural maneuvers, had avoided
trial for over two years. During this period the plaintiff was obliged to pay over
$70,G0 royalties under the contract it sought to terminate. Brief for Plaintiff-Appcllee,
p. 4. As the case was nearing trial, the district judge made a preliminary order striking
four defenses for insufficiency, severing the remaining issues, directing a separate trial
of the basic issues, and granting a preference of that separate trial. The defendant then
attempted to appeal from this order, but his petition was dismissed by the court of
appeals in a per curiam opinion which held the order to be interlocutory.
8. See Morgantown ,. Royval Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1943) ("Trials
ought not to be delayed and appellate dockets crowded by appeals from interlocutory
orders. .. ").
9. The malfunctioning of the final judgment rule in these two respects has led to
the incisive criticism of Crick, supra note 2. And see Note, 47 CoL. L. Rv. 239 (1947).
Where hardship is occasioned by an erroneous interlocutory ruling, the concept of
finality is sometimes ballooned to permit an appeal; in other instances, interlocutory
orders are made appealable by a judicial e.x-tension of the statutory exceptions to the
final judgment rule. See note 1 supra. Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S.
188 (1942), is an example of the latter technique. In this case an order directing that
an equitable counterclaim be heard and disposed of by the court sitting in equity prior
to a trial of the action at law was held to be, in effect, an interlocutory injunction and
hence appealable. Professor J. W. Moore has sharply criticized this holding as "... . a
procedural anachronism which is at odds with the new federal procedure, and which flies
in the face of the well-settled federal policy against interlocutory appeals; ... it is
only by an ingenious resort to the obsolete that the Court can bring the Eftleson case
within the statutory authorization of an interlocutory appeal" 3 Mon, FEUZV.r PRAc-
rica 29 (Supp. 1942). Judge Clark in Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 54 (2d Cir. 1943),
acknowledged the force of this criticism, but went on to say: ".. . for our purposes we
must of course consider it [the Ettleson case] as gloss upon the statute, intended to pro-
mote prompt settlement in a case of the important question of form of trial.'
10. A decree directing land to be sold in an action for partition is interlocutory.
Sowell v. Sowell, 101 Miss. 623, 57 So. 626 (1912). And see opinion of Chief Justice
Taney in Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 205 (U.S. 1843), in which he warns the circuit
courts of the danger of cancelling deeds and ordering property sold and delivered prior
to a final judgment. Cf. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Soutter, 131 U.S. ApR=nd.
h-xvi (1868) (decrees directing payment of rent by one railroad to receiver of second
railroad not final).
The injustice occasioned by the final judgment rule most often arises in cases of an
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of actual litigationmay have been wasted when a pre-trial ruling is held re-
versible error. 1 At present, even though the trial judge is uncertain as to the
correctness of his ruling, there is no way of obtaining a prompt determination
of its propriety.
To a limited extent appellate courts have exercised supervisory power over
interlocutory rulings by means of prerogative writs. In theory these extra-
ordinary remedies lie only from final judgments.12 An exception is made,
however, where a lower court improperly assumes or denies jurisdiction.13
Thus, where interlocutory orders grant or refuse changes of venue, 14 decline
to substitute parties to suits,15 or remove cases from the jury docket, 10 appel-
late courts have found error "jurisdictional." In these instances writs of
mandamus or prohibition have been granted directing the trial judge to alter
his ruling. The common law writ of certiorari has similarly been used.17 But
in practice the usefulness of these prerogative writs is seriously curtailed by
the difficulty of choosing the proper remedy in a given situation.' 8 Technical
distinctions between the writs have created lines which are often too fine for
perception. And the concept of "jurisdiction" is so nebulous that litigants are
equitable nature, where litigation is long and complicated. In England equity practice
never recognized the common law rule that only final judgments were appealable, This
may be explained historically by the manner in which the courts of chancery developed.
Originally, suits in equity began and ended in the same court. The Chancellor was re-
garded as the sole judge in chancery, and he reviewed all the interlocutory orders and
decrees of the masters, who were regarded as mere clerks. It proved more convenient,
under such circumstances, to review intermediate decisions as the case progressed than
to await a final judgment. See Crick, sstpra note 2, at 547.
11. For example, the current trial in New York of the eleven leaders of the Com-
munist Party has been in progress for several months. During pre-trial proceedings the
defendants objected to the method used in selecting the jury, but their objection was
overruled by Judge Medina. If the final judgment is adverse to the defendants, this
issue will undoubtedly be raised on appeal; and should the preliminary ruling be held
erroneous, months of trial litigation will have been wasted.
12. FERis, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 299 (1926). See Bank of Columbia
v. Sweeny, 1 Pet. 567, 569 (U.S. 1828); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,
30 (1943).
13. Ex parte United States, 319 U.S. 730 (1943) ; Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp.,
265 U.S. 86 (1924).
14. State ex rel. Daily v. Harrison, 215 Ind. 106, 18 N.E.2d 770 (1939) (mandamus
available but denied on the merits) ; State ex rel. Martin v. Super. Ct., 97 Wash. 358,
166 Pac. 630 (1917) (prohibition granted).
15. In re Connaway, 178 U.S. 421 (1900).
16. Ex parte Simmons, 247 U.S. 231 (1918).
17. Carpenter v. Central Vt. Ry., 84 Vt. 538, 80 Atl. 657 (1911) (denial of petition
for change of venue reviewable by certiorari). Technically, certiorari-unlike prohibition
and mandamus-is a corrective rather than a preventive measure. At common law It
issued subsequent to a final judgment in order to bring before the appellate court por-
tions of the record not assigned as error. See Bordwell, Extraordinary Remcedies, 9 Am.
LAw & PRoc. 207, 232 (1913).
18. See Crick, supra note 2, at 563.
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often unable to determine whether any of these writs is available.' 0 More-
over, federal appellate courts have become increasingly reluctant to make use
of these extraordinary remedies to interfere with interlocutory decisions. - o
Prompted by a desire for greater flexibility in the rules governing appeals,
Judge Jerome Frank has advocated the adoption of a procedure by which the
appellate courts could, at their discretion, grant interlocutory appeals on peti-
tion of aggrieved litigants. 21 The proceedings would be analagous to the issu-
ance of statutory writs of certiorari by the Supreme Court. Recognizing, how.
ever, that many interlocutory orders concern purely procedural points, Judge
Frank would limit the scope of permissive review to those "decisions of lower
courts affecting substantive rights."-
2 2
If discretionary power were vested in appellate courts, erroneous rulings
could be corrected without delay. And Judge Frank contends that this pro-
cedure would neither lengthen litigation nor crowd appellate calendars. He
argues that since considerable time is presently expended by appellate courts
in deciding whether an order is "final" or "interlocutory"23-a meaningless
19. This has led one distinguished scholar to suggest: "The first step toward a
rational appellate procedure should be the total abolition of all these forms...." Sun-
derland, The Problem of Appellate Re-view, 5 TEx. L. REv. 126, 132 (1923).
20. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
21. See the opinions of Judge Frank in American Machine and Metals, Inc. v. De
Bothezat Impeller Co., 173 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1949) (order directing sepirate trial of
basic issues in case and granting preference for that trial held not appealable since inter-
locutory) (dissenting opinion); United States cX rcl. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F.2d 94,
102 (2d Cir. 1948) (petition for writ of habeas corpus collaterally attaching jurisdiction
of court that committed petitioner for civil contempt held properly denied where juris-
dictional issue had been litigated) (dissenting opinion); Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940,
952 n.12 (2d Cir. 1947) (order holding that a receiver acting for the asserted owner of a
chose in action has no title thereto held not appealable since interlocutory) (dissenting
opinion); Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1943) (judg-
ment granting motion for summary judgment dismissing complaint, but not disposing of
counterclaim, held not appealable since interlocutory) (concurring opinion); Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F2d 895, 898 n.3b (2d Cir. 1943). cert. denicd, 322 U.S. 733 (1944)
(order strildng claim based on distinct cause of action held final and appealable).
This proposal is roughly synonymous vith English procedure. The Judicature Act
of 1925 provides: "No appeal shall lie. . . without leave of the judge or of the Court
of Appeal from any interlocutory order ... " 15 & 16 GEo. V. c. 49, § 31(1) (i), 4 H,-Ls.
STAT. 162 (1925). And see the provision in the District of Columbia Code Virmitting
appeals . . . from any other interlocutory order, in the discretion of the said United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. .. " D.C. CoDz § 17-101 (1940).
In Mississippi a judge of the Supreme Court may in his discretion grant an inter-
locutory appeal "in exceptional cases" in equity. Miss. Coz A::,. § 1148 (1942). There
is a comparable provision in TEx. CoDE § 9033 (1934).
22. Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d S95, 89S n.3b (2d Cir. 1943), cert. dcnicd, 322
U.S. 738 (1944).
23. The concept of finality, still "slithery" at the margin, is gradually becoming
crystallized by judicial decision. Treatise writers have catalogued hundreds of orders
and decrees as appeallable or non-appealable. See 1 OaLn u, FmzAL. PawcrTcc 694
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question in itself-the burden would be little greater if appellate judges could
directly determine which orders should be reviewed.
2 4
While the proposed remedy unquestionably would correct the deficiency at
which it is aimed-the inability of a litigant to obtain a prompt review of trial
orders affecting substantive rights-it seemingly fails to counter the objections
traditionally levelled at extensive interlocutory appeals. The proposed criterion
governing the allowance or denial of petitions for review would, except in
those instances where the petition was patently frivolous, necessitate a sub-
stantial determination by the appellate court of the merits of each attempted
appeal.2 Therefore, the courts might be only slightly less burdened than they
would be if appeals of interlocutory rulings were permitted as of right. Since
the way would be left open for a potential deluge of dilatory petitions for re-
view, this procedure might be transformed into a weapon for the financially
strong. Furthermore, in states where interlocutory appeals have been freely
permitted, experience has shown that technical procedural points are unduly
emphasized, since the appeal is usually from a pre-trial decision. 20 Stress is
placed on form rather than merit, a choice singularly out of line with the spirit
of the Federal Rules.2
7
The problem which has evoked Judge Frank's rather drastic proposal might
be more satisfactorily solved by vesting in the trial court, rather than the appel-
late court, discretion to grant interlocutory appeals.28 This procedure would
et seq.; DoBIE, FEDERAL JUEISDICTIoN AND PROCEDURE 792-7 (1928) ; and see Rector v.
United States, 20 F.2d 845, 861-71 (8th Cir. 1927). Nevertheless, the question con-
tinues to be extensively litigated. See, e.g., Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1947).
24. See Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1943);
Crick, supra note 2, at 557-8. But Judge Frank suggests that if the additional labors
imposed by discretionary appeals prove too great, ". . . doubtless Congress would pro-
vide for the appointment of additional judges." Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co.,
supra, at 627.
25. See Judge Clark, dissenting in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 908 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944).
26. In the New York state courts, appeals may be taken as of right from almost all
interlocutory orders. N.Y. PRAc. Acr § 609 (Clevenger 1947). This has been suggested
as the reason for the unusual emphasis on procedural objections in New York state prac-
tice. Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F2d 895, 907 n.5 (2d Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944). Moreover, a New York attorney has stated that the
frequency of interlocutory appeals in state practice results in a preference by litigants for
the federal courts. Harper, Civil Practice in the Federal Courts 81 in PRACTISING LAw
INSTrrUTE, TRiAL PRAcricE (1946).
27. "The objective of the Rules is ... (1) 'Decisions are to be on the merits and
not on procedural niceties."' 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 56 (1948). See Moore v.
Illinois Central R.R., 24 F.Supp. 731, 733 (S.D.Miss. 1938).
28. This proposal has previously been advocated in the model rules of the American
Judicature Society, XIV Am. JuD. Soc. BuLL. 181 (1919) ("The trial court may, in its
discretion, grant leave to appeal from any other interlocutory order.") ; see also Moore
& Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure,
35 VA. L. REV. 1, 7, 45 (1949).
Judge Frank, in a recent opinion, has recognized the desirability of certification,
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be roughly analagous to certification, the district judge possessing power to
allow an appeal either at request of counsel or, if decision has been reserved,
on his own motion. The trial court, knowing all the facts, is in the best posi-
tion to determine the advisability of allowing an interlocutory appeal, and it
can make a decision without interrupting the progress of the case. - Certifica-
tion has long been an available technique in many state jurisdictions 0 and
has proven an effective escape from the occasional deleterious consequences of
the final judgment requirement. 31
A practical objection is the possibility that a trial judge may improperly ena-
American Machine and 'etals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co., 173 F2d S90 (2d Cir.
1949) (dissenting opinion). However, he continues to advocate that overriding discretion
be placed in the appellate court, so that the parties might still petition for review should
the trial judge refuse to certify.
29. This consideration is outlined in a critique of the proposed rules of appellate
procedure in the California state courts published in 15 So. C,~'.t L. RLv. 500, 504, 512,
(1942).
30. ALA. CoDr% tit. 7, § 745 (1940) ; 30 F" ST. A.r. (Sup. Ct. Rule 3,a) (194S)
("questions or propositions of law that are determinative of the cause and are without
controlling precedent") ; IxD. LAws c. 76, § 1 (1937) ; MAss. A-,xz. LAws c. 214, § 30
(1933) ("so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought, before further
proceedings, to be determined by the full court"); 39 Mnnu.. STAT. A:;:. 605.69(4)
(1947) ("order sustaining . . . or overruling a demurrer"); N.D. LAws, c. 32, §2401,
2402 (1943) ("construction or interpretation is in doubt and vital, or of great moment in
the cause"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:27-202 (1939); N.L Ruv. LAws c. 370, § 15 (1942)
("Questions arising upon exceptions, upon a special verdict, an issue of law, motion for
a new trial or in arrest of judgment, or other motion or proceeding"); R.I. Grc.a. LAws
c. 545, § 6 (1938) ("any question of law.. . of such doubt and importance... that it
ought to be determined by the supreme court before further proceedings"); V'. STAT.
§ 2124 (1947); NV. VA. CoDm § 5788 (1943) ("Any question arising upon the sufficiency
of a summons or return of service, or challenge of the sufficiency of a pleading").
Moreover, in the federal courts the recent amendment to Rule 54(b)-authorizing
the trial court to determine for purposes of appeal the finality of a limited class of pre-
liminary rulings--implicitly endorses the rationale underlying certification. Rule 54(b)
originally provided: "Vhen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the
court ... may enter a judgment disposing of such claim" These judgments were held
final if the appellate court felt they adjudicated separate "causes of action." The difficulty
in defining a "cause of action" led to considerable confusion and much litigation. Sce,
e.g., Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 105 F2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939); Sidis v.
F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). Conse-
quently, in 1947 Rule 54(b) was amended to read: "When more than one claim for re-
lief is presented in an action.., the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon
one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment." Thus, the appealability of separate judgments is now controlled by the trial
judge's determination of finality. See ADviSoR- CO i2.rrn'S NOTE To Fr.. R. CIV. P.,
54(b) (June 1946 Report) ; Notes, 56 Y.uLE L. J. 141 (1946), 47 COL. L. Rmr. 239, 254
(1947).
31. "Postponement of review of the question here presented, until after a final or ap-
pealable decree, would obviously inflict the suspense, inconvenience, and delay from which
it was the legislative purpose to relieve." Gulland v. Gulland, 81 WVra. 487, 4S0, 94
S.E. 943 (1918).
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ploy his discretionary power.3 2 The effectiveness of certification depends in
large measure upon the way in which it is used, abused, or ignored. Where a
trial judge is aware of the undue hardship which would arise from an errone-
ous ruling and is uncertain of applicable law, conscience and prudence should
dictate present certification rather than possible future reversal. Since this
is the path of least resistance, there is perhaps a danger of too many certified
questions.3 3 However, under instructions from the courts of appeals a set of
working principles should emerge within each circuit which will guide the
trial judge in his decision to certify.4
The general requirement of a final judgment should be retained in so far as
it realizes its objective of expediting litigation. But where the postponement
of appellate review is wasteful or threatens the substantive rights of litigants,
some procedure for prompt review should be devised. As a supplement
to the final judgment rule, a method of certification, endowing the trial court
with discretionary power to allow an immediate appeal, would provide a
remedy in the exceptional harsh case without substantially altering the pres-
ent framework of appellate procedure.3
32. See Judge Frank, dissenting in Clark v. Taylor, 163 F2d 940, 952 n.12 (2d Cir.
1947).
33. The suggestion has, therefore, been made that the certificate of the district court
be, in effect, a petition that the court of appeals give appellate aid at that point; by this
method certification would not invoke the obligatory jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Moore & Vestal, supra note 28, at 45. This reserve power is perhaps desirable, in the
event that a district judge should attempt to shift to the appellate court all responsi-
bility for making decisions. But generally it may be assumed that any question con-
sidered by the trial judge of sufficient doubt and significance to warrant certification
will, if unanswered, eventually be returned to the appellate court on an appeal as of
right. Moreover, in order to determine whether the trial judge is properly exercising
his discretion, it would probably be necessary to explore the merits of each certified
appeal. Therefore, the power to dismiss a certification without answer would be of value
only in exceptional circumstances.
34. Considerable local discretion should be allowed in order that each circuit may
adjust the flow of interlocutory appeals as the appellate court catches up to or falls be-
hind its obligatory docket. See Moore & Vestal, supra note 28, at 45.
35. The final judgment rule is a statutory provision; insofar as it would be amended
by the extension of the power of certification to the district courts, legislative action
would be required. The Enabling Act, 48 STAT. 11064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1948),
empowering the Supreme Court to construct rules of procedure, does not authorize
changes in appellate jurisdiction. See 3 MooRE; FEDERAL PaAcrcr 3155 (1938); Clark,
Power of Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 HAuv. L. REv. 1303,
1321 (1936).
A Texas statute permitting certification from the district courts to the court of
civil appeals was declared invalid on the grounds that it was not a legitimate exercise of
either appellate or original jurisdiction within the terms of the state constitution.
Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933) ; see Note, 82 U. OF PA, L. Rrv.
175 (1933). But this problem would not arise in the federal system, since under the
Constitution the jurisdiction of the inferior courts is wholly statutory. U.S. CoNsr. Art.
III, § 1; see Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
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